



Making a Virtue of Evil: A Five-Step Social Identity Model of the Development of Collective Hate

Stephen Reicher,^{1*} S. Alexander Haslam^{2*} and Rakshi Rath¹

¹ School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews

² School of Psychology, University of Exeter

Abstract

In the first part of this paper, we re-examine the historical and psychological case for ‘the banality of evil’ – the idea that people commit extreme acts of inhumanity, and more particularly genocides, in a state where they lack awareness or else control over what they are doing. Instead, we provide evidence that those who commit great wrongs knowingly choose to act as they do because they believe that what they are doing is right. In the second part of the paper, we then outline an integrative five-step social identity model that details the processes through which inhumane acts against other groups can come to be celebrated as right. The five steps are: (i) *Identification*, the construction of an ingroup; (ii) *Exclusion*, the definition of targets as external to the ingroup; (iii) *Threat*, the representation of these targets as endangering ingroup identity; (iv) *Virtue*, the championing of the ingroup as (uniquely) good; and (v) *Celebration*, embracing the eradication of the outgroup as necessary to the defence of virtue.

‘The Banality of Evil’: How the Consensus Was Formed

Philosophical and historical perspectives

If there is one phenomenon that, above all others, marks out the 20th century, it is the Nazi Holocaust. Amongst other things, this showed that modern industrial society does not make us more rational and more civilized than before, it simply gives us more sophisticated tools for expressing our barbarity (Bauman, 1991). And if there is one image, above all others, that embodies our understanding of how people could be so barbarous, it is the picture of Adolf Eichmann, organiser of the Holocaust, sitting in a glass booth during his trial in Jerusalem.

Eichmann sits slightly hunched, somewhat slight and balding. He wears a nondescript suit. He is fastidious in his acts. He is moderate in expression. And this very ordinariness was profoundly shocking. For a man who had done such monstrous things seemed nothing like a monster. The sense of

incongruity was caught and immortalised by the philosopher Hannah Arendt who came to Jerusalem to witness the trial and documented her impressions in her book *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (Arendt, 1963/1994). Arendt noted that psychiatrists had described Eichmann as ‘a man obsessed with a dangerous and insatiable urge to kill’ who had ‘a dangerous and perverted personality’ (Arendt, 1963/1994, 21). But that was not the man she saw in front of her. On the contrary, Eichmann looked like a typical colourless bureaucrat, and his biography seemed to bear that out. Much of his life had been devoted to dealing with details, carrying out orders, making things work. He took pride in doing his job efficiently and the fact that the job involved mass murder seemed almost incidental. As Arendt famously put it, the lesson to be drawn from this was: ‘the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought defying *banality of evil*’ (1963/1994, 252, emphasis in original).

Now, from the start, it is important to make a clear distinction between Arendt’s own writings and the subsequent fate of her ideas (see Newman, 2001; Waller, 2002). Arendt provides a much richer and more rounded portrait of Eichmann than is usually acknowledged and her explanation of his acts – and of Nazism more generally – is both rich and nuanced (see, for instance, Arendt, 2007; Piterburg, 2007). Yet, as happens so often, a complex body of work is simplified in the retelling and complexity is reduced to a simple aphorism. In this case, although the term ‘banality of evil’ occurs only once in the last sentence of her book, it proved sufficiently compelling to overshadow the preceding 250 odd pages. If Arendt is a victim of misrepresentation, this is in part a consequence of her own excess of eloquence. However, it is also partly due to the political sensitivities surrounding her book.

‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’ spurred furious controversy, not so much due to what she had to say about Eichmann himself, but more due to her trenchant critique of the role of Jewish leaders in Nazi occupied territories – many of whom had since become part of the Israeli establishment. As a result, there were attempts to discredit her motives and her arguments as a whole – including her arguments concerning the nature of evil. For instance, it was suggested that, in calling evil ‘banal’, Arendt was trivialising Nazi atrocities (for summaries of this and of the wider controversy, see Piterberg, 2007, Zertal, 2005). In fact, the term does not refer to the acts at all. Arendt fully recognises their full horror. Rather, she is referring to the processes by which such terrible acts come to be committed. Her argument has three core elements.

The first was that Eichmann and his ilk did not represent a ‘psychological type’ that is fundamentally distinct from the rest of us. Circumstances may have led these people to behave differently to those living in kinder times, but we should have no confidence that we too could not become killers if we found ourselves in their position. This, perhaps, is the

most disquieting aspect of her argument. It tears away from us the comforting illusion that murderers are a different breed to ourselves.

Second, and linked to this, Arendt was suggesting that the acts of Nazis like Eichmann arose out of commonplace motives that most people share: the desire to be valued and accepted by others, to do one's job well, to advance in one's career. Most of the time, these motives can lead to harmless and even noble acts, as Newman (2001) illustrates. But wanting to be accepted by racists and bigots has decidedly harmful consequences. Depending on the groups available to us, the desire to be accepted and elicit approval could lead in very different directions. To put it slightly differently, the variability in behavioural outcomes is less a matter of psychological differences than of social opportunities.

In combination, these two arguments constitute what is probably the main way in which 'the banality of evil' is commonly understood. This is the idea that 'anyone can do it' and the associated sentiment that 'there but for the grace of God go I'. This view is bolstered by a wealth of recent research on the Holocaust that shows that those involved in the killings could fairly be described as 'ordinary men' – the title of Browning's (1992) analysis of the activities of Reserve Police Battalion (RPB) 101 (though see also Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 1999; de Mildt, 1996, both cited in Waller, 2002). RPB 101 was one of the mobile killing units that operated in German-occupied Poland and that was responsible for murdering at least 38,000 Jews between July 1942 and November 1943. Browning shows that the members of this battalion were not fanatics – if anything, before the war, they had been less pro-Nazi than the norm. However, they carried out their murderous orders even when they were given the option to refuse. This evidence leads Browning to conclude his book with a chilling rhetorical question: 'if the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot?' (1992, 189).

Yet, there is a third element to Arendt's argument, one that derives from her earlier work on totalitarianism first published in 1951. This has to do with the psychological processes that permit ordinary men (and they almost always are men) to commit mass slaughter. Critically, she invokes a failure of imagination not a failure of conscience. That is, killers become obsessed with the *process* of doing their jobs. Their sense of right and wrong becomes narrowed down to how well, even how creatively, they fulfil the demands put upon them. They never raise their gaze to look outside their jobs and consider the consequences of their work. Sometimes, this is used to suggest that killers are thoughtless. This, perhaps, is a little misleading. Rather, the problem lies in the narrow horizon to which their thought is applied. As Arendt puts it, Eichmann 'had no motives at all. He *merely*, to put the matter colloquially, *never realized what he was doing*' (Arendt, 1994, 287, emphasis added).

Psychological perspectives

The power of 'the banality of evil' idea does not derive from Arendt's work alone, or even from the wider historical and philosophical studies of the Holocaust. Rather, it comes from a confluence between this work and developments in the realm of psychological understandings of hostility and conflict. Throughout the 1950s, a series of landmark studies had shown the power of groups to transform behaviour – typically for the worse. Notably, Muzafer Sherif showed the ease with which one can generate hostility between erstwhile friends simply by dividing them into two competing groups. After one particularly bruising intergroup encounter, Sherif (1966) famously observed that any outside observer, entering the situation at this point, could only have concluded that these boys, far from being selected as 'the cream of the crop' in their communities, were actually wicked, disturbed, and vicious individuals.

Perhaps even better known, Solomon Asch (1952) showed how people will seemingly ignore the evidence of their eyes in order to go along with the judgement of other group members. Although Asch himself actually saw these experiments as showing that, even under the most severe group pressure, most people still don't conform, his experiments are generally remembered as saying the opposite. Like Frankenstein's monster, Asch's creation subverted the creator and fed into the growing view that group processes lead us unerringly into evil.

This developing consensus culminated in what are probably the two best known pieces of research ever conducted in social psychology – or indeed psychology as a whole – both of which became directly associated with the 'banality of evil' perspective. The first was Stanley Milgram's famous set of 'obedience' studies. These examined the willingness of participants to obey an experimenter in giving what seemed to be increasing levels of electric shock to a supposed 'learner' (actually a confederate of Milgram's) each time a mistake was made. These were conducted even as Eichmann's trial was in progress and were first published in 1963 – the same year as *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. The studies are remembered for the fact that, in the baseline study, every participant kept obeying the experimenter and administering shocks up to a level of 300 volts. Moreover, the clear majority (65%) continued to obey right up to the maximum level of 450 volts – beyond a point labelled on the 'shock generator' as 'Danger Severe Shock'.

Milgram, it seemed, had shown that ordinary Americans, no less than ordinary Germans, are capable of extraordinary acts of cruelty through unthinking conformity. The parallels between Milgram and Arendt went further. The psychologist explained his findings in terms that appear very similar to those of the philosopher – which is hardly surprising since Milgram had no theory to guide him when he undertook his studies and drew openly on Arendt in order to make sense of what he had found 'after the fact' (Blass, 2004). Milgram's notion of the 'agentic state' first

saw light in his 1974 book *Obedience to Authority*. In the face of strong leadership, Milgram argues, people cede responsibility to authority (in his case, the experimenter) and simply focus on how well they can serve this authority. This was no act of plagiarism. Milgram openly acknowledged the source of his inspiration, noting that ‘Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might dare to imagine. The ordinary person who shocked the person did so out of a sense of obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject – and not from any peculiarly aggressive tendencies’ (1974, 23, 24).

If Milgram suggested that strong leadership can induce people to lose their moral and intellectual compass, then Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) pushed the argument one step further. Yet again, though, the complexities of the findings have been polished off in the retelling, leaving a narrative that is simple and compelling in equal measure (though see Baron, 1984; Reicher & Haslam, 2006a, for fuller accounts and critiques). In this, young men were divided into ‘guards’ and ‘prisoners’ in a simulated prison setting, and although the study was scheduled to last 2 weeks, it had to be halted after 6 days because the guards were becoming increasingly brutal, whereas the prisoners were becoming increasingly damaged (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Zimbardo, 1989, 2004, 2007).

Zimbardo explains these powerful phenomena in terms of the way that participants conform blindly to role – losing both perspective and the ability to make informed moral choices. Significantly too, this is also an argument that he has recently applied in defending the Military Police Officers who committed atrocities in Abu Ghraib. He portrays these MPs as ‘merely bit actors’, ‘seven characters in search of an author’ and claims that they were ‘essentially clueless as to what was appropriate and what was not acceptable when preparing detainees for interrogation’ (Zimbardo, 2007, 381, 390).

For Zimbardo, though, the situation alone is sufficient to produce such effects even (or perhaps particularly) in the absence of overt leadership. As the researchers put it, in the SPE, guard aggression was ‘emitted simply as a “natural” consequence of being in the uniform of a “guard” and asserting the power inherent in that role’ (Haney et al., 1973, 12). The significance of this argument was not lost on a *New York Times* reviewer who recently commented that ‘Zimbardo’s prison study was even more shocking [than Milgram’s research], if only because the students assigned to play guards were not instructed to be abusive, and instead conformed to their own notions of how to keep order in a prison’ (Stanley, 2006).

In Zimbardo’s case, as in Milgram’s, there is an intellectual cross-fertilisation between the historians/philosophers and the psychologists – although when it comes to Zimbardo, psychology is less borrower than borrowed from. Thus, just as Milgram drew from Arendt, so Browning, the author of *Ordinary Men*, likens the situation for German troops in 1940s Poland to the position of guards in the Stanford Prison study.

For both, the ‘system alone was a *sufficient* condition to produce aberrant, anti-social behaviour’ (Browning, 1992, 168, emphasis in original).

Given this perpetual to and fro, it is hard to know whether philosophy, history, or psychology should be given precedence in changing the way we view evil today. Indeed, even to talk of ‘precedence’ is to miss the point. It is the fact that each seems to be buttressed by the other that has made the overall story seem so unimpeachable – although note that, in combining forces, something of Arendt’s original argument has been transformed (Newman, 2001). Although she saw the killer as a myopic thinker, she certainly did not suggest that killers lack choice. Hence, ‘under conditions of terror most people will comply but *some people will not*, just as the lesson of the countries to which the Final Solution was proposed is that “it could happen” in most places but *it did not happen everywhere*’ (Arendt, 1963/1994, 233, emphasis in the original). However, over time, this myopic killer has transmuted into an automaton who thoughtlessly and helplessly does whatever leaders or roles prescribe. And certainly, as Newman (2001) complains, this is how the term ‘banality of evil’ has come to be understood.

Moreover, this view has overspilled academia and become part of contemporary culture. Consider, for instance, the opening lines from ‘Us and Them’, a track from Pink Floyd’s 1973 album *Dark Side of the Moon* which, to date, has sold over 40 million copies:

Us and them
And after all we’re ordinary men.
Me and you
God only knows its not what we would choose to do.

More generally, to quote from Novick’s analysis of *The Holocaust in American Life*: ‘From the sixties on, a kind of synergy developed between the symbol of Arendt’s Eichmann and the symbol of Milgram’s subjects, invoked in discussing everything from the Vietnam War to the tobacco industry, and, of course, reflecting back on discussions of the Holocaust’ (2000, 137).

Questioning the Consensus

Given that the ‘banality of evil’ hypothesis originates from the observation of Eichmann in Jerusalem, perhaps the most telling critiques are those which have recently re-evaluated the nature of Eichmann and of his fellow Nazi bureaucrats. Once again, this is bound up with the wider controversy surrounding Arendt. For some, re-evaluating Eichmann involves a trenchant critique of her entire position. Thus, in a recent biography, Cesarani (2004) suggests that Arendt’s analysis was based on a partial account of Eichmann’s trial, which derived from the fact that she attended only a small part of what was a 5-month trial – notably the period when the defence outlined its case and Eichmann gave his own testimony. In this

period, the defence team was aware that the prosecution would seek to show that the defendant was a sadistic monster and their whole strategy was to undermine such a view. Eichmann was to act as a mild and fastidious man. Cesarani and others argue that Arendt was taken in by this charade. To quote Vetlesen's acerbic phrase, 'in suggesting that he was "merely thoughtless", she in fact adopts the very self-presentation he cultivated' (2005, 5). According to such authors, had Arendt stayed to hear the testimony of Eichmann's victims – those who had experienced him in action – she may have come to a very different conclusion about the man.

According to others (Newman, 2001), the problem lies less with Arendt herself than with the way her work has been transmitted, so that what is needed is a *return* to the original text. Certainly, she provides a detailed portrait of Eichmann's activities that is very far from the stereotyped picture of a man who passively followed orders. She notes his creativity in devising new forms of anti-semitic procedures, his zeal in pursuing 'the final solution' and, most remarkably, the way he clashed with Himmler who he considered too moderate in pursuing the deportation of Hungarian Jews to the death camps.

Ultimately, though, the question of whether a re-evaluation of the evidence involves burying or else resurrecting Arendt is irrelevant to our purposes. What counts is the evidence itself and what it tells us about the processes through which Eichmann and others came to be killers. Here, matters seem somewhat clearer. The testimonies of Eichmann's victims show that Eichmann had no illusions as to the fact that he was deporting people to their deaths. Equally, in conversations taped after the war by a fellow Nazi, William Sassen, Eichmann not only acknowledged but endorsed his actions as a mass murderer. Equally, in conversations taped after the war with a fellow Nazi, Willem Sassen, and perhaps intended for a biography, Eichmann demonstrated that he knew and celebrated his role in mass murder:

My innermost being refuses to say that we did something wrong. No – I must tell you in all honesty, that if of the 10 million Jews shown by [the statistician] Korherr, as we now know, we had killed 10.3 million, then I would be satisfied. I would say 'All right. We have exterminated an enemy'. (Cesarani, 2004, 219)

Lozowick (2002) makes similar points about Hitler's bureaucrats in general. He shows that those who staffed the branches of the bureaucracy devoted to the Holocaust were notable for their initiative and for their ideological zeal. Like Eichmann, they believed that they were doing the right thing and they did so in the full knowledge of what was happening. Vetlesen notes that 'as a matter of principle ... even the cadres traditionally referred to as "desk-murderers" had plenty of blood on their hands' (2005, 44). To take one particularly bloody example, orders were given prior to the 'liquidation' of the Minsk ghetto that every SS Officer should be involved in the executions – especially those who had not yet been

'blooded'. There is much evidence that these officers – and indeed Eichmann himself – found such activities unpleasant. That, in part, is why the mechanical killing of the death camps was developed (see Rees, 2005). But this is very different from saying that they thought it wrong. If they had any moral qualms, they were for the well-being of the killers, not the lives of the killed.

What, then, of the 'ordinary men' whom Browning analyses? The strength of Browning's analysis is to show that they were not ideologically disposed to Nazism at the start. But neither can they be described as thoughtless, or as automatically obeying either rules or roles. Vetlesen makes an important distinction between 'thoughtlessness' and 'insensitivity'. The killers, he argues, had both choice and awareness, but they didn't care about the lives they took and they didn't seem to think they were doing wrong. In explanation, Vetlesen draws on the work of Daniel Goldhagen – a highly contentious figure in Holocaust studies about whom we wish to make no general evaluation. But he surely makes a powerful point in suggesting that the Nazi soldier who walked a young girl into the woods, put a gun to her head, shot her, and pushed her body into a pit could not ignore the consequences of his actions. Yet, asks Goldhagen, 'Did he see a little girl, and ask himself why he was about to kill this little, delicate human being who, if seen as a little girl by him, would normally have received his compassion, protection and nurturance? Or did he see a Jew, a young one, but a Jew nonetheless?' (Goldhagen, 1996, 217).

In the light of such re-examination, slowly but surely, the tide in the historical literature seems to be turning against the view that the Holocaust was perpetrated by people whose crime was to cede responsibility, to become thoughtless, to focus on means to the extent that they ignored the ends of their actions. In turn, this means that those psychological analyses that purport to show how easily people cede responsibility and become obedient would seem to have limited application to the Holocaust (Miller, 2004). Cesarani, for instance, complains that, '[The] notion of the banality of evil, combined with Milgram's theses on the predilection for obedience to authority, straightjacketed research ... for two decades (2004, 15). Clearly, though, we need to examine such a radical conclusion in greater depth.

Before we start, however, it is important to stress the importance of Milgram and Zimbardo in transforming post-war social psychology. Before them, extreme action (and social behaviour more generally) was explained largely in terms of personality. Since them, the focus has shifted to the importance of context, particularly group context. We certainly do not want to roll back these advances or to underplay the contribution of these authors. Quite the opposite, in fact. Our aim is to build upon their achievements and to contribute to a debate that they made possible. More specifically, we want to discuss *what sort* of group account is necessary to account for the phenomena they so powerfully document. In doing so, we suggest that there is little evidence for the claim that people automatically

or 'naturally' lose awareness of, or control over, what they are doing when faced by authority figures or when put in groups. Indeed, as we have argued elsewhere (Haslam & Reicher, 2007, 2008), such claims even have some difficulty in accounting for what happened in Milgram's or Zimbardo's own studies.

In Milgram's case, we have already pointed out that the notion of an 'agentic state' was very much an after-thought, being first proposed in 1974, more than 10 years after his initial studies were conducted. Such a notion cannot explain the different levels of obedience obtained in variants of the baseline study (varying from 65% when participants only hear the reactions of the 'learner' to 30% where they have to force his hand down onto an 'electric contact plate' and down to 10% where there is a dissenting confederate teacher). Film and transcript of the studies also show that, far from becoming morally disengaged and passive, participants were profoundly troubled by what they were doing and initiated long debates about the justification for continuing the study. Both Milgram's own studies and subsequent research (Mantell & Panzarella, 1976) find no relationship between the amount of responsibility attributed to the experimenter and levels of obedience. In short, there is nothing to support the 'agentic state' and much to question it (Blass, 2004). At the very best, it must be considered 'unproven'.

The problems surrounding Zimbardo's 'role' explanation of the Stanford Prison Experiment are equally acute. Remember that Zimbardo's claim is that, just as people lose the ability to question authority, so they tend naturally to lose the ability to question role requirements. In a recent summary, Zimbardo repeats that analysis, stressing that: 'participants had no prior training in how to play the randomly assigned roles' (2004, 39).

Yet, such an account seems to overlook Zimbardo's own substantial role in his study (Banyard, 2007). More specifically, it is inconsistent with the instructions he gave to his guards at the start of the SPE:

'You can create in the prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to some degree, you can create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is totally controlled by us, by the system, you, me – that they'll have no privacy at all. ... There'll be constant surveillance. Nothing they do will go unobserved. They'll have no freedom of action, they can do nothing, or say nothing that we don't permit. We're going to take away their individuality in various ways. In general what all this leads to is a sense of powerlessness'. (Zimbardo, 1989)

What is striking about this passage is not only the way in which Zimbardo tells the guards what to do, but also the way he positions himself in order for these instructions to be maximally influential (Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005). He repeatedly refers to himself and the guards as 'we' or 'us', positioning himself as 'Head Guard' and as a prototypical ingroup member (Turner, 1991). And by setting himself up as 'one of us', this gives him greater licence to tell this 'us' what to do (see Haslam, 2001;

Reicher et al., 2005; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Turner, 1991). In other words, participants were not simply exposed to roles; they were also subjected to leadership (see also Banuazizi & Movahedi, 1975; Lovibond, Mithiran, & Adams, 1979).

This is not to say that all Zimbardo's guards passively complied. Once again, the evidence from the study, as acknowledged by Zimbardo himself (Zimbardo, 1989), is at odds with the simple role explanation he has consistently championed over the years (see Baron, 1984). Rather than all 'succumbing' to role expectations, some guards sided with the Prisoners, some sought to be firm but fair, and a few were actively brutal (a distribution that corresponds closely to that of Browning's 'ordinary men'; see Browning, 1992, 168). In terms of events inside the 'prison', of course, it is the last of these who prevailed. But it can be argued that they did so by being *hegemonic* (perhaps because the other guards acknowledged them as Zimbardo's true representatives) not by being in the majority. However, even as Zimbardo's representatives, those who were brutal were neither thoughtless nor did they 'simply obey orders'. This is illustrated by an interchange, filmed in the aftermath of the SPE, between the most zealous of the Guards (dubbed 'John Wayne') and one of the Prisoners he tormented. 'John Wayne' asks his erstwhile victim how he would have behaved had he been put in the role of Guard. The Prisoner acknowledges that he doesn't know. But then, more forcibly, he differentiates himself from the guard by reflecting: 'I don't think I would have been so *inventive*. I don't think I would have applied as much *imagination* to what I was doing. Do you understand? ... If I had been a guard I don't think it would have been such a masterpiece' (Zimbardo, 1989).

For the SPE as for the obedience studies, then, the evidence does not suggest that participants were thoughtless or incapable of choice. Although the phenomena were both powerful and disturbing, they lack a convincing explanation. More generally, the 'banality of evil' approach does not stand up in either psychology or history. Why, then, does it endure in our textbooks and in the wider culture? One reason is that it seems to serve a useful political purpose – in particular, serving to deny individual responsibility for atrocity, especially when perpetrated by ingroup members (Haslam & Reicher, 2006a; Konečni, 2007). A second reason lies in a disciplinary version of 'pluralistic ignorance'. Both historians and psychologists have doubts about the approach in their own sphere, but each believes it has strong support in the other – and after all, for social psychologists at least, this is one of the few areas where our discipline has had substantial impact outside of our own realm (see Blass, 2004).

It is therefore time for the different disciplines to come together again in order to realise that we have consensus, but that now our consensus is in opposition to the idea that inhumanity is thoughtless. This consensus involves a rejection of 'the banality of evil' thesis. It also involves agreement about the form of explanation that should replace this thesis (i.e., a

recognition that acts of extreme inhumanity are active not passive, careful not careless, mindful not mindless). For both history and psychology point to the fact that perpetrators of collective evil know what they are doing, that they have choice over what they are doing, that they are creative in what they are doing and indeed that they celebrate what they are doing. This is not only true of the Holocaust. Todorov (2004, 71) quotes the character Ikonnikov, from Vasily Grossman's novel *Life and Fate*, as saying, 'Even Herod did not shed blood in the name of evil; he shed blood in the name of his particular good'. Ikonnikov also draws out a corollary: claims about creating an eternal good generally involve spilling the blood of innocents. Hence Todorov himself concludes that 'projects aiming to eradicate evil so as to usher in a reign of universal good are best left alone' (2004, 71).

In sum, then, what is truly 'fearsome, word and thought defying' (to echo Arendt, 1963, 252) is emphatically not that killers are unaware that what they are doing is wrong. Rather, it is that they *really believe* that what they are doing is right. It is that they manage to make a virtue out of evil (Staub, 1989). One of the primary purposes of the analysis that follows is to understand how this is made possible.

The Dynamics of Inhumanity: Five Steps from Evil to Virtue

The thrust of our argument thus far is aimed at making one basic point. For far too long, research on the human capacity for evil has been stymied by asking the wrong questions. If we want to move forward, we therefore need to change the questions we ask. Instead of wondering how people can ignore the evil that they do, research needs to be aimed at explaining how people can come to celebrate acts of inhumanity as acts of virtue. In the second part of this paper, we outline some answers.

We stress that, at present, this is a preliminary sketch. As we have argued elsewhere (Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2006), a full answer is necessarily multi-level, multi-dimensional, and multi-factorial. At the very least, we need to distinguish between those who join, are transformed by, and come to lead radical movements when they are small minorities lying outside the societal consensus and those who go along with such movements when they grow to take power (see Billig, 1976). Moreover, there may be somewhat different reasons why leaders preach hatred and why others follow them.

Take, for example, Ludden's (1996) analysis of Hindu-Muslim antagonisms in India. Ludden traces anti-Hindu violence to the changing basis of Congress Party political authority. Historically, the party gained its support by controlling the Head men in rural areas who in turn would use their authority to deliver the vote. But as traditional patterns of authority declined, Congress leaders appealed directly to the Hindu

majority by invoking a Muslim threat against which they would be the bulwarks. Thus, for the politicians, hatred was a means by which they could claim to represent and promote the ingroup – thus gaining ingroup support and power over rival political contenders. For the masses, hatred was a means of defending their group identity against imagined Muslim rivals.

But whatever differences there are, it would also be wrong to go too far in the opposite direction. Political leaders may have their political reasons, but they are rarely completely cynical. It may serve their purposes to pathologize certain outgroups, but that does not mean that they do not believe in what they are saying. Fuller (2006), for instance, shows how the Russian government cracked down on their ethnic Germans subjects at the start of World War I in order to bolster their ‘patriotic’ credentials. But he also shows that ministers genuinely feared that this population was fertile ground in which the German national enemy could recruit spies. More generally, Barker (2001) shows that when rulers propound the legitimacy of their actions, they do not only seek to convince the ruled. They also need to convince themselves that what they are doing is right. As Barker puts it, this is because ‘when subjects lose faith in rulers, government becomes difficult. When rulers lose faith in themselves, it becomes impossible’ (2001, 68).

Applying this adage to our present concerns, we suggest that both the Eichmanns and the ‘ordinary men’ needed to believe that killing was the right thing to do in order to act as they did. But it also implies a very different paradigm for studying intergroup animosity to that which predominates in our discipline. Social psychologists often seem to analyse phenomena such as prejudice and discrimination as if people came to their beliefs and feelings by surveying the world from a position of Olympian detachment (Condor, 1996). They observe, they churn the information through their cognitive apparatus, and they act on the output. All the while, they are oblivious to the cacophony of voices from those around them, from the media, and from politicians all seeking to shape their understanding of other people. That is, as one of us has argued elsewhere (Reicher, 2007), one of the more alarming features of contemporary psychological work on intergroup relations in general, and intergroup hatred in particular, is an almost complete neglect of issues of leadership. This is reflected in the fact that, whereas Allport himself devotes a whole chapter of ‘The nature of prejudice’ to racist leaders (Chapter 26: Demagogy), the 50th anniversary retrospective on this work (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005) makes no mention at all of either ‘demagogy’ or ‘leadership’.

A comprehensive understanding of outgroup hate must therefore acknowledge that racism is not simply an accidental quirk of the human psyche, but something that has been deliberately and knowingly mobilized (Tajfel, 1981). It must analyse why leaders seek to mobilize hatred against

others and also how they are able to mobilize such hatred (see Reicher, forthcoming; Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2006, for a theoretical approach to this question; for empirical examples, see Kershaw, 1987 and Stern, 1975 on Hitler; Falasca-Zamponi, 2000 on Mussolini; Carter, 1995 on George Wallace). In this paper, our focus is related more to the latter than the former. That is, how must leaders represent 'us' and 'them' in order for us to hate them and even clamour for their destruction?

Before we can consider the specific steps by which this occurs, three general framing observations need to be made. First, it is worth underlining that the issues that concern us here are to do with collective phenomena and collective identities. Genocides are perpetrated against others not because of what they have done but because of the groups they belong to. Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals were killed by the Nazis simply because they were Jews or gypsies or homosexuals. Their individual acts and choices (even a choice to renounce their group membership and, say, convert to Christianity; e.g., see Némirovsky, 2006) were irrelevant.

Second, although we are dealing here with the ways in which great ill can be committed by groups, we want to stress that we are not subscribing to the classic view that groups necessarily lead to destructive and anti-social behaviour. Indeed, we explicitly reject such a view. For every example of groups acting anti-socially against others, we can find examples of equal levels of self-sacrifice on behalf of others. It is certainly true, for example, that, in the Soviet Union, many millions were imprisoned or starved simply for being designated a 'kulak' or a member of some other pathologized category. But it is equally true that, without collective solidarity, this and other dictatorships would not have been toppled. The Romanian revolution, for instance, began in Timisoara where large crowds challenged Ceausescu's notorious Securitate police force. Many demonstrators were killed. Still, the numbers of demonstrators grew. In Bucharest, one eyewitness recalled, 'The Securitate threw itself against them. Then I saw adolescents kneel down, open their shirts in front of the barrels of rifles and cry "fire, as in Timisoara"' (translated from the French as quoted in *Humanité Dimanche*, 1989). For these youth, the fate of the Romanian people was more important than life itself.

Even in the paradigmatic case of the Holocaust, there is room to see the good of groups as well as the bad. Certainly, as we have already indicated, the overwhelming emphasis quite rightly lies on the ways in which people were slaughtered simply because of their group membership – on the fact that a young girl can be distanced from any sense of empathy because she is seen purely and simply as a Jew. Yet, amongst all the slaughter, it is important not to overlook the small but significant signs of resistance – a resistance that existed even within the closed universe of concentration camps and extermination camps (Rousset, 1946/2005). In his monumental analysis of all such activity in the camps,

Langbein (1994) repeatedly makes the point that resistance was only possible at a collective level and that – taking into account the different levels of repression directed at different groups – those who were most effective in fighting back (and in surviving) were those that had most solidarity and most cohesion: the communists amongst the political prisoners, the Zionists amongst the Jews, the Russians and the Spaniards amongst nations. Certainly people were persecuted as groups, but only as groups could they do anything about their persecution (see Haslam & Reicher, in prep).

For us, then, there is nothing inherent about ingroup process that tends to either ill or good. Indeed, the same underlying psychological processes can lead to both good and ill. Which of these eventuates has nothing to do with the nature of either humans or groups. Rather, it has to do with choices people make about the way they define their groups. In this particular sense, we agree with Todorov when he articulates the classic humanist position derived from such figures as Montaigne and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Good and ill are “of one substance” with human life because they are the fruits of our freedom, of our ability to choose at every point between several courses of action’ (2004, 26).

Closer to home, we also agree with Brown (2000) when he argues that one of the critical tasks for social psychologists – and social identity theorists in particular – is to understand precisely when groups display hostility to each other. And, as he suggests, a central component of that task is to ‘develop a theoretical account which links identity processes to the formation and dissemination of belief systems that allow group members to justify such treatment of outgroup members or which legitimate inequality’ (Brown, 2000, 769). In a sense, what follows is an attempt to meet this challenge. Or, at least, to elaborate on the challenge a little, we seek to clarify how the belief systems that facilitate outgroup hatred are centred on the ways in which we define our own social identities and those of others.

Third, we shall identify five steps in the definition of social identities that allow for acts of extreme inhumanity. These are (i) the creation of a cohesive ingroup through shared social identification; (ii) the exclusion of specific populations from the ingroup; (iii) the constituting of the outgroup as a danger to the existence of the ingroup; (iv) the representation of the ingroup as uniquely virtuous; and (v) the celebration of outgroup annihilation as the defence of (ingroup) virtue. We do not suggest that any of these steps is, in itself, particularly original and, even if the fourth and fifth may not have received much attention inside social psychology, they certainly have been stressed by students of conflict, terror and genocide (e.g. Catherwood, 2002; Hofstadter, 1996; Juergensmeyer, 2001, Staub, 1989). In this sense, what we offer is essentially a review and integration of the field. By combining disparate elements that are already in circulation, we hope to provide some clarity as to the overall processes

by which mass killing becomes possible. In addition, however, we hope that the way in which we have combined these elements provides insights that go beyond any single position and that brings to the fore some important themes that have generally been neglected in the literature as a whole.

In particular, a key aspect of our argument is that the way we define the ingroup is *as* crucial, if not *more* crucial, than definitions of the outgroup in generating hatred. This is in contrast to the great majority of psychological research that looks to stereotypes and to prejudice – that is, how we think and feel about the *other* – in order to explain such phenomena as racism and discrimination (see Reicher, 2007). In the following analysis, by contrast, the very notion of ‘them’ is shown to be contingent upon how we determine the criteria that define ‘us’. And equally, the way we think and feel about what they are doing – especially when it impinges on the ingroup – is contingent upon the value we attach to ourselves. In a sense, then, our first four steps (which together set up the possibility of celebrating ‘evil’ – our fifth and final step) can be divided into two pairs: ingroup definition and outgroup exclusion; outgroup threat and ingroup virtue. Each pair is interdependent. None takes logical or temporal priority over the other. But precisely because, in academia and in society at large, we have traditionally focussed on only the outgroup component it is all too easy to take the ingroup component for granted, thus neglecting its ideological importance in the process of enabling genocide.

However, we are getting ahead of ourselves. It is time to outline the five steps of our model in somewhat more detail.

Step 1: Identification – creating a cohesive ingroup

We suggested above that good and ill derive from the same psychological processes. To take the argument a step further, one cannot understand how people can do ill in the name of their group unless one also acknowledges the good that they derive from group membership.

According to the social identity tradition, and to self-categorization theory in particular, a shared sense of category membership (i.e., of social identity) is the psychological basis of group action (Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). It is only to the extent that we think of ourselves as Catholics, Socialists, Germans, or whatever, that we can act together as Catholics, Socialists, or Germans. At root, this is because, when a given group membership is salient to us, we act upon the particular norms, beliefs, and understandings associated with the relevant self-category. What is more, we expect others to do likewise. Hence, we can presuppose a consensus with fellow group members about what the world is like, what matters in the world, and what we should be doing about it.

This helps resolve one of the classic problems of social psychology: How is it that masses of people are able to act together in crowds even without clear structure or clear leadership? The classic answer has involved denigrating the mass, claiming that people in crowds lose all reason and become subject to simple emotional contagion – helplessly following those around them. However, this fails to account for the highly specific and meaningful patterns of mass action (see, for instance, Thompson, 1971). Work on crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1984, 1996, 2001) shows that people are able to act purposively, meaningfully, and collectively precisely to the extent that they assume a common social identity and hence act on the basis of common norms beliefs and understandings. When these conditions apply, no-one is needed to tell anyone how to act in order for all to act together. When these conditions do not apply, people will not act together however much would-be leaders seek to tell them what to do. In other words, only those who identify together can mobilize together.

There is, by now, a wealth of research that expands upon this core insight. Shared social identification leads people to seek agreement and common ground with others (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998); it leads them to trust, respect, and cooperate with others (Tyler & Blader, 2000); it makes organization and leadership possible (Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005); it leads to mutual support (Haslam, O'Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna, 2005) and to acts of solidarity and helping (Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005).

We suggest that this transformation of relations between people makes collective experience positive and beneficial for well-being in at least three ways. First, it protects against negative influences on well-being. Thus, as group members, the support we both expect and receive makes us better able to overcome – rather than succumb to – stressors (Haslam, O'Brien, Jetten, Vormedal & Penna, 2005; Haslam & Reicher, 2006b). Second, the feelings of being supported by others, of having one's views validated by others and of being accepted by others are positive experiences in and of themselves. This is confirmed by studies of the Magh Mela in Northern India (a Hindu festival that constitutes possibly the largest collective gathering in the world). What is more, in this case, such factors were found to have an impact on the reported well-being of participants (see Cassidy et al., 2007). Similarly, Piliavin (2006) has shown that the sense of mattering to others that one gains from collective participation is associated with enhanced well-being.

Third, the coordination of action that shared social identification makes possible is a source of empowerment: it provides group members with an ability to pull together to overcome obstacles and to achieve their collective goals. In this way, collective beliefs, values, and understandings can be transformed into an actual way of life – a process that

we have termed ‘collective self-objectification’ (Drury & Reicher, 2005) or ‘collective self-realisation’ (Reicher & Haslam, 2006b). In groups, then, individuals become effective agents. Rather than being shaped by others, they are able to shape their own history. Such agency, we argue, is highly beneficial for the well-being of individual group members.

Taking all these points together, we argue that the classic views of group psychology are a precise inversion of the truth. Groups do not obliterate human identity, human choice, and human agency (e.g., as argued by Zimbardo, 1969). Rather, they provide both the ends and the means for people to be agents (Reicher & Haslam, 2006c). Groups, especially cohesive and powerful collectivities, are essential to our social presence and our social being. That is why people are so attached to and so passionate about their group memberships. That is why they respond so powerfully to what befalls their groups. That is why they can kill and are even prepared to die for their group memberships.

Step 2: Exclusion – placing targets outside the ingroup

We can summarise the foregoing by saying that there are clear psychological benefits to group membership – to which one can add the obvious point that there are clear institutional benefits to certain memberships as well. For instance, being defined as a ‘national’ opens up the way to citizenship rights, to the use of public services, of voting rights, etc. It follows that being excluded from group memberships deprives one of the associated personal, interpersonal entitlements. Being defined as an ‘alien’ tends to exclude a person from both political and civil society. Foreigners tend not only to be deprived of the right to vote but also to be seen as less able to represent community organizations. In this sense, then, outgroup members tend *ipso facto* to suffer discrimination in the sense of being deprived of the positives accorded to ingroup members.

All this makes the question of how we define category boundaries absolutely critical. This is an issue that is particularly salient in the case of national categories. Here a distinction is often made between ‘ethnic’ definitions of nationhood which rest on descent and ‘civic’ definitions that are rooted in residence and commitment, although in practice few nations go to either extreme (Poole, 1999; Torpey, 1999). However, it is not limited to nationhood since the issue of who belongs to any social category is always open to debate (Billig, 1987; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The same people will be treated very differently as a function of whether they are included through a broad definition of the group or else excluded through a narrow definition.

Let us use a stark contrast to make our point. We have said much about the evils of the Nazis. However, as Claudia Koonz (2003) points out, it is impossible to explain the appeal of Nazism without understanding how it was presented as a *moral* project – a project of cleansing and

renewal in a world of squalor, decay, and chaos (which of course the Nazis did much to create in order to pose as the solution; Evans, 2004; Rees, 1997). Above all, it was about rediscovering community and solidarity: creating bonds to others and putting service above self. As Goebbels put it: 'What is the first Commandment of every National Socialist? ... Love Germany above all else and your ethnic comrade [*Volksgenosse*] as your self' (quoted in Koonz, 2003, 7). The devil lies in the detail, and the detail here lies in the term 'ethnic comrade'. For Goebbels, the German ingroup is defined in an exclusive way that excludes Jewish people, gypsies, and others. All the love and support and service are reserved for the ethnic ingroup, and the ethnic outgroup can have no hope of their solidarity.

Now consider the case of Bulgaria, the one country in the Axis sphere during World War II from which no Jews were deported to the death camps (although there were deportations from the lands occupied by Bulgaria). When, in 1940/1941 and 1943, the Nazis called for deportations there were large popular counter-mobilizations that stopped them in their tracks (Bar-Zohar, 1998; Ben-Yakov, 1990). Todorov (2001) has compiled the key texts that were used to mobilise people, and Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins and Levine (2006) have analysed the arguments they contain. Perhaps the most striking aspects of these texts is how rarely the word 'Jew' is used. Those under threat are characteristically referred to as Bulgarians, as a national minority, and even when the term 'Jew' is used, the authenticity of their Bulgarian nationhood is expressed with poetic intensity. Thus, Todor Polyakov, a Communist parliamentarian, declared in the National Assembly:

Bulgaria's Jews ... speak and think in Bulgarian, have fashioned their style of thinking and their feelings after Botev, Vazov, Pencho, Slaveikov, Yavorov etc. They sing Bulgarian songs and tell Bulgarian stories. Their private selves are modelled on ours – in the street, on our playing fields, at school, in the barracks, in workshops and factories, in the mountains and the fields, our sufferings are their sufferings, our joys their joys too. (quoted in Todorov, 2001, 65, 66)

The contrast could not be more stark. Where (national) category boundaries are drawn so as to include Jews as ingroup members, they receive heroic assistance. Where (national) category boundaries are drawn so as to exclude Jews from ingroup membership, they are excluded from society and denied their rights. But, of course, the persecution of the Jews was not limited to the withdrawal of the positive benefits of nationhood and citizenship. It went to the extremes of negative sanctions. As various social psychologists (including ourselves) have pointed out, albeit from a number of different theoretical perspectives, we should not assume that the psychological processes underlying the withdrawal of positives and the imposition of negatives are the same (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 2001;

Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000). Thus, even if category exclusion is a necessary step towards hatred and genocide, it cannot be a sufficient condition. Further steps are necessary, as we shall now elaborate.

Step 3: Threat – the outgroup as endangering the enactment of ingroup identity

The step from withdrawing benefits to active hostility against outgroups maps, we suggest, onto the step from excluding others from the ingroup to construing them as a threat to the ingroup. There are many groups who are not 'of us', but this fact does not necessarily make them 'against us'. In the case of immigration, for instance, much influx attracts little negative comment and may even invite positive comment where incomers are seen as complementing or enriching the indigenous population. The problems come where certain groups are seen as constituting a problem for their hosts (Miles, 1989; Miles & Phizacklea, 1984), particularly where the problems are seen as deriving from inherent characteristics of these groups: their stupidity, their aggressivity, their deviousness, or whatever. Hence the pernicious power of essentialist ideologies such as racism. What counts in these ideologies is not simply what 'they' are like, but rather what 'their nature' means for 'us'.

Of course, there is nothing novel in pointing to the importance of threat to outgroup hostility. The idea is present in Allport's classic text (Allport, 1954) and is central to a considerable number of more recent models (e.g. Blalock, 1967; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doojse, 1999; Brewer, 2001; Duckitt, 2000, 2003; King & Wheelock, 2007; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). However, beneath this seemingly growing consensus, the way that threat is conceptualised varies widely. Hence, it is important to be explicit about how we use the term.

We conceptualise threat as the belief that outgroups, by their actions or their mere presence, endanger the social being of ingroup members (i.e., their ability to exist *as a group*). There are three important elements to this position. The first is that there can be no a priori definition of what constitutes threat because it will depend upon the elements that are seen as essential to the group identity. In some cases, this may relate to economic factors and hostility may derive from the claim that 'they' are taking 'our' jobs or driving down 'our' wages. Such instances accord well with the notion that 'realistic competition' is at the root of negative intergroup relations (Sherif, 1966). However, equally often, it may relate to the fact that 'they' are seen to endanger 'our values', 'our culture', and 'our way of life' (Fryer, 1984; Miles & Phizacklea, 1984). Clearly, then, what constitutes a threat to 'our way of life' depends upon what constitutes this way of life.

Second, our focus is on the practical-experiential rather than the perceptual aspects of identity. For us, identity is more than simply a way

of perceiving oneself in the world; it is also a model of the way the world should be organised and a project for creating such a world (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 2004). Group action is aimed at establishing ways of social being which are based upon the values and beliefs of the group and, as we have already argued, success in so doing (collective self-objectification/realisation) is experienced as highly positive. But, as a corollary, the failure to objectify one's social identity is experienced highly negatively (Reicher & Haslam, 2006a), and where this failure (or the potential for failure) is associated with an outgroup, it leads to considerable hostility towards this outgroup. The hostility, then, is not a function of the outgroup's characteristics per se. Thus, a negative characteristic (say, stupidity) can decrease the ability of the outgroup to constitute a practical threat to the ingroup, whereas a positive characteristic might increase this ability and hence increase hostility (see Reicher, 2007). Equally, hostility does not derive directly from the similarity or difference of the outgroup to the ingroup, or even from the incompatibility of ingroup and outgroup identities. Once again, the issue is how these feed into an assessment of whether the outgroup threatens our ability to live by the terms of our identity. For that reason, we term the critical construct to be a sense of '*identity undermining*' (see Sindic & Reicher, forthcoming).

The third element of our position is that outgroup threat (or '*identity undermining*') is not something that is objectively given or even something that is perceived in the situation. Rather, it is something that is actively constructed. Just as the precise meaning of identity is always contested (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), so the meaning of the other for our identity is equally contested. Threat arguments can take many forms. Sometimes, they can be couched in the seemingly neutral statistics of population growth. Thus, for example, in Northern Ireland, the greater growth rate of Catholics compared with Protestants has been used by loyalist groups to show the dangers of an eventual republican takeover and destruction of loyalist culture. Likewise, the birth rate of black populations in Britain is used by racist parties as an indicator of threat to 'British culture'. In current research being conducted by Rath and Reicher on Hindu nationalism, we find that a core element in the propaganda is sets of tables which compare Hindu and Muslim (and, sometimes, Hindu and Christian) birth rates in different districts of the country. The point is always to promote the conclusion that 'they are swamping us'.

Sometimes, the argument is more direct. Thus, Hindu nationalist organizations and activists (known as the Hindutva) do not restrict themselves to tables of figures. Dr. Pravin Togadia, a prominent leader who, notoriously in 2002, sought to justify the massacre of Muslims by Hindu crowds in the province of Gujarat, was subsequently interviewed by the Muslim '*Milli Gazette*' (archived at <http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15102002/1510200233.htm>). He explained that the source of communal violence

lay in the victims, not the perpetrators: 'Globally, it is Muslims who are fighting everywhere ... Islam has an exclusive totalitarian system believing in jihad, terming the non-Muslims as kafirs. This intolerance is basically responsible for the Hindu-Muslim problem'.

Here, the outgroup is an inherent threat because of its culture. More often, nature is invoked in order to claim that outgroups will inevitably destroy their hosts if they are not destroyed first. This explains two widely found forms of hate discourse. One is the concern with sex and sexuality. Outgroup members – whether black people, Jews, or Indians – are often portrayed as inherently lascivious, their men as lecherous and potent, the women as seductresses. Indeed, as Kiernan (1995) points out, the notion of black people as 'child-like' was often underpinned by the argument that development after puberty was arrested by an obsession with sex. Given this undisciplined desire, 'we' are necessarily at risk at both the individual and collective level. Rape is the ultimate metaphor for the defilement and corruption of the (ingroup) innocent. Miscegenation is the ultimate fear for those who define the ingroup in biological terms. Hence, laws against inter-marriage have been central to regimes rooted in such definitions – notably Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa.

Another use of hate discourse is the use of animal images and metaphors. Characteristically, this is seen as reflecting the dehumanisation of the outgroup (see, for instance, Dower, 1986; Todorov, 2004), and indeed it is. But there is more than dehumanisation involved, for the images are not of just any animals. To take one example, the infamous Nazi propaganda film 'Der ewige Jude' (The eternal Jew) intercuts images of teeming Jewish populations with pictures of swarming rats and maggots. To take another, Hutu propaganda depicted Tutsis as cockroaches. These are not just animals, they are vermin which, by definition, are destructive or injurious to survival – in both cases, the survival of the group. Hence, such representations suggest that the continued existence of the ingroup depends upon the eradication of the outgroup. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler writes this of the Jewish person:

He is and remains the typical parasite, a sponger who like a noxious bacillus keeps spreading as soon as a favourable medium invites him ... wherever he appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or longer period (1980, 277).

Once outgroup threat has been added to category exclusion, it becomes possible to see the destruction of the outgroup as an act of self-defence rather than an act of aggression. As has been shown in other contexts, this helps overcome norms of non-violence and facilitates the involvement of those who initially opposed belligerence in acts of collective hostility (Stott, Hutchison, & Drury, 2001; Stott & Reicher, 1998). However, although self-defence may be a legitimate act and one that makes aggression something that is acceptable to the ingroup (and even to wider communities beyond the group), it is still not sufficient to make attacks on others into

something noble and something to be celebrated. For this to be possible, one further step is needed.

Step 4: Virtue – representing the ingroup as (uniquely) good

It is striking how often those involved in the greatest brutality are those who expend great efforts to extol ingroup virtue. Earlier, we made the point about Nazism presenting itself as a *moral* project. Despite Hitler's candid anti-semitism in *Mein Kampf*, Koonz notes that, from the moment he took power in 1933 until the outbreak of war, he hardly ever made mention of Jews. Instead, he devoted his efforts to extolling the distinctive virtues of (ethnic) Germans. The German Volk, he argued, were moral and pure and selfless and loyal. They were humble and they were just and they were devout. He pledged himself to defending these qualities and creating a society in which they could flourish. His watchword and his project was, 'Cleanliness everywhere, cleanliness of our Government, cleanliness in public life, and also this cleanliness in our culture' (quoted in Koonz, 2003, 22).

A similar point can be made about Stalinist Russia. Overy (2004) makes the point that the so-called Stalinist terror was never construed as such by the perpetrators and the majority of the population. Rather, it was seen as a moral struggle between the good people and an evil foe – as Stalin termed them 'wreckers, diversionists, spies, terrorists, sent behind the frontiers of the Soviet Union' (quoted in Overy, 2004, 176). This was a war of virtue *against* terror. The conflict 'pitted poor peasant against kulak, honest worker against masked bourgeois, the regular army recruit against masked bourgeois' (Overy, 2004, 216). Indeed, as with Nazism, the whole Stalinist project was presented as a fundamentally moral enterprise, often framed in the most hyperbolic terms, and this was crucial to securing popular consent even for its repressive policies. Thus, in 1935, Bukharin (who himself was purged and shot in 1938) wrote that 'Stalin, the architect of the new world [inspired a plan] almost a fairy tale, almost magical [to make Moscow] a new Mecca to which fighters for the happiness of mankind will stream from all ends of the earth' (cited in Overy, 2004, 218).

One might reasonably assume that such protestations of virtue would protect against sin and that the construction of pro-social ingroup norms would lead to pro-social behaviours. Indeed, there is a body of work that suggests precisely this. Thus, where groups have norms of helping the oppressed, their members will defend others against attack (Reicher et al., 2005) and where there are norms for toleration, members compete to show how generous they can be, even to outsiders (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997). Yet, we must beware against too simple and mechanical a view of social norms. Long ago, it was noted that to call the English 'freedom-loving' means something very different as a function of whether

one is fighting against Nazism or fighting against Pakistani immigrants moving in next door (Schwarz, 1982). What is true of 'freedom loving' is true of any such ascription. It is a framework within which to make sense of and respond to specific events; yet, by this very token, its action implications cannot be determined independently of the event under consideration.

Thus, certainly, protestations of ingroup virtue can sometimes generate generosity to outgroups. But under conditions where the outgroup is construed as sinful, such protestations can have more paradoxical effects. When 'we' are held to be virtuous, then, on one hand, the more serious the outgroup threat becomes. On the other hand, the more it becomes acceptable to 'defend ourselves' by eliminating this outgroup threat – even if this means eliminating the outgroup itself. Let us consider the former effect in this section and leave the latter to the next. In order to do so, we will return to the notion of a 'war against terror', albeit in its contemporary guise of concerns about (radical) Islam.

In the Indian context, Kaur (2003) shows how Hindutva organisations use the notion of Hindu tolerance to argue that all Indians must be tolerant and therefore Hindu. Any other position – specifically, being Muslim – undermines (Hindu) virtue and hence cannot be countenanced. Hence, Kaur refers to 'a tolerance that breeds intolerance' (p. 24). Her argument has some resonance closer to home. On 9 December 2006, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair made a widely heralded speech on multiculturalism. In a critical passage, he spoke about the rights of different religious groups to their own identities and cultures. He then stressed that there are certain 'essential values', tolerance notable amongst them, which define Britishness and which everyone has a duty to accept. As he put it in concluding, the overall message was, 'Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don't come here'. Blair made clear that he was addressing the Muslim community (amongst others), but he was equally clear that he did not see all Muslims as intolerant, only a small minority amongst them. His stated intention was to involve the moderate majority in the national struggle against extremism. Nonetheless, to the extent that Islam as a whole is represented as an intolerant religion, the Prime Minister's tolerance talk sends the message that being Muslim is unacceptable in Britain. Less deliberately than Hindutva rhetoric, perhaps, but equally consequentially, Blair promotes a tolerance that breeds intolerance.

Van Rijswijk, Hopkins, and Reicher have begun to conduct experimental studies that address these points. Thus, we find, first, that simply labelling Turkey as Islamic increases the extent to which British respondents rate the population as intolerant and different. Second, this also increases the extent to which these respondent wish to exclude the Turkish from Europe. Third, and critically for the present argument, the more that a European norm of 'tolerance' is made salient, the

more that an Islamic Turkey is rejected as lying outside the domain of acceptable opinion.

What does all this imply for Hitler's pre-war turn from anti-semitic to pro-German rhetoric? Does it indicate – as some believed at the time – that it marked an attenuation of his hatred for the Jews and of his discriminatory policies? Not at all. History has conclusively and tragically demonstrated the falsity of such hopes. But we would go further. Once Jews had been defined as alien and as threatening, then emphasising ingroup virtue actively facilitated and radicalised outgroup hatred. As we shall show in the final sub-section, it transformed genocide from a matter of moral opprobrium to a matter of moral duty.

Step 5: Celebration – eulogising inhumanity as the defence of virtue

Once all the pieces are in place, it becomes easy to see how genocide can be made something to celebrate. Where 'they' are defined as not being of 'us' and as being against 'us', and where, in addition, we create a Manichean view of the world in which we represent good and they represent evil, then their defeat – if necessary, their destruction – becomes a matter of preserving virtue.

It is a logic, we suggest, that is central to all modern forms of terror and was, perhaps, best expressed by the man who organised the first modern terror (before himself becoming one of its victims). In a speech to the Convention on 5 February 1794, Maximilien Robespierre famously asserted that, 'if the spring of popular government in time of peace is virtue, the springs of popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror; virtue, without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless' (Robespierre, 2007, 115; see also Scurr, 2006; Žizek, 2007).

This unfolding logic unfold can be seen clearly in the arguments of Hindu nationalist leader Pravin Togadia. We have already cited passages where he represents Muslims as both alien and dangerous to Hindus. Togadia also devotes time to representing Hindus as virtuous. He asks of his interviewer, 'Do you know that Hinduism believes in the doctrine of Jeevastha Jivvasam meaning, "Live and let live"'. And later, he asserts, 'Hinduism is synonymous with harmony'. In this context, 'self-defence' against Muslims, becomes a moral imperative. Thus, he asks, 'If we are saving a civilization that preserves 1100 religions and 1600 dialects, defending it against a totalitarian and violent religious belief system ... is it wrong? Finally, lest anyone be unclear as to what such 'self-defence' might entail, Togadia draws upon a core cultural myth to drive home his point. He says, '(w)hen the secularists selectively condemn the Gujrat violence, it seems that without Sita haran the Lanka dahan is imagined'. The Sita haran was the abduction of the goddess Sita by the demon Ravana. Sita's husband, the God Rama, then followed Ravana to his

kingdom of Lanka and, in an act of purification, destroyed it with fire (the Lanka dahan). In other words, those who object to the slaughter of Muslims miss the point that such action is a morally justified or even necessary response to an act of violation against Hindus. The real massacre of innocents is elevated to the status of a holy rite.

In this moral universe, those who kill have moral strength and those who don't are morally suspect. Robespierre again makes the point concisely and clearly, 'To punish the oppressors of humanity: that is clemency; to forgive them, that is barbarity' (Robespierre, 2007, 117). Of course, the politics of this statement depend on who one construes as 'humanity' and who one construes as its oppressors. Robespierre certainly did not share the Nazi use of racial categories, but they certainly shared his view that those most diligent in eradicating the enemies of the people were the best of the best. In terms of National Socialist imagery, where the Jews were portrayed as sewer rats, everyone knew that they needed to be exterminated, but only the bravest and the most selfless were noble enough to go down into the dark and actually accomplish the unpleasant task (Koonz, 2003).

These ideas are succinctly summarized in a speech by Himmler that stands as one of the most chilling ever made. Speaking in Poznan to an audience mainly comprised of the SS, this was how he rallied them to their bloody work:

Most of you must know what it means when one hundred corpses are lying side by side, or five hundred or a thousand. To have stuck it out and at the same time ... to have remained decent fellows. This is a page of glory in our history (Rees, 2005, 226).

Conclusion

We began with the image of Eichmann in Jerusalem. We sought to show that this image was intended to mislead and indeed has misled researchers by taking them down the wrong path when seeking to understand the psychology of genocide. We argued that killing does not derive from inattention. Rather, killing only becomes acceptable (or 'natural') when it can be celebrated as *the right thing to do*. Accordingly, we suggest that the image of Eichmann, the hunched paper pusher, be replaced with another image. It is that which Cesarani (2004) uses for the cover of his biography. Here, Eichmann is dressed in his SS uniform; his hat adorned with the SS Death's Head insignia. His head is slightly tilted to the left. He stares directly at the camera. His look is confident; he sports a slightly sneering smile.

This is the Eichmann of the Holocaust. This is the man that the trial judge was enquiring of when he suggested, 'At that time it was considered a glorious act to destroy the Jews? The Jews were looked upon as a germ that had to be destroyed, just like any other disease? And pitilessness was considered a virtue?' And this is the image that Eichmann in the glass

booth validated when he replied, 'Yes, this is correct, that I must admit' (Cesarani, 2004, 300).

But can we use the Death's Head Eichmann as emblematic of the human capacity for evil in general? We have already addressed this point in part. We have acknowledged that, in many ways, he was different from most others. He was a zealot, an early convert, and an unrepentant killer even after the war. Yet, we have also argued that he was a true believer, and that he shows the dangers of seeing a single pole of virtue that must be preserved whatever the cost. In this way, he is indeed emblematic of the path that takes us to genocide. Perhaps not everybody takes each step with such alacrity, but once they do, then ordinary men can indeed become genocidal.

We draw three general lessons from this argument. The first is that, individually, the steps that take us to genocide are not necessarily or self-evidently bad. There is certainly nothing wrong in forming groups. Indeed, as we have illustrated, in many cases, it is only in groups that oppression and inequality can be combatted (Haslam & Reicher, in prep). People may often define groups narrowly without even thinking about the consequences for those they exclude, let alone meaning to harm them. Defining threat may be more problematic, but the celebration of ingroup virtue characteristically seems entirely benign. But, like the elements of a chemical reaction, what is harmless in isolation may prove explosive in combination. Hence, it is only at the very end of such a process that we realize the danger and we may not be forewarned about the consequences of component actions. Our aim, then, is to provide just such a warning. We need to be keenly aware of the implications of the ways that we define self and other. We need to treat such definitions with immense care for, without even knowing it, they may direct us down a path that leads to terrifying and tragic outcomes.

The second lesson, which is a development of the first, has already been mentioned in introducing our 'five steps' but it is sufficiently important to bear repeating. That is, the way we define ourselves may often be more relevant to genocide than the way we define others. But because, when we think of racism, discrimination, and hatred, our gaze is so firmly focussed on how the outgroup is viewed – and hence our defences are so designed as to guard against negative outgroup perceptions – we almost entirely ignore the way in which (i) our definition of the ingroup is critical to who receives rights and (ii) our definition of ingroup virtue is necessary to outgroup destruction (Livingstone & Haslam, 2008). It is therefore important for psychologists and anti-racists to redirect their gaze and understand the centrality of self-understandings to the treatment of others (Reicher, 2007).

The third and final lesson is that the answers we provide are only as good as the questions we ask. We have insisted throughout – and we insist again – that the task is to explain how mass murder can be celebrated,

not how it is ignored. We have devoted some effort to explaining how such celebration becomes possible. But we readily acknowledge that these efforts are partial and preliminary. It is notable that we draw on diverse sources and multiple historical examples in order to illustrate our argument rather than provide systematic evidence generated by our argument. That is, our emphasis on identification, exclusion, threat, virtue, and celebration is more a program for future research – research that we hope to conduct and that we hope to have motivated others to conduct – than a report of finished research. Our claim, then, is not to have arrived at our destination but at least to have charted the direction in which we should be travelling.

Short Biographies

Stephen Reicher works on the relationship between social identity processes and collective behaviour. He has published well over 100 articles, chapters, and books on such topics as crowd behaviour, intergroup relations, collective solidarity and helping, leadership and mass social influence, nationalism, and, recently, the psychology of tyranny. He is a past editor of the *British Journal of Social Psychology* and one of the scientific advisors to *Scientific American Mind*. He has served as Vice-President of ADRIPS (the international French language Psychology association) and is on the Governing Council of the International Society for Political Psychology. Currently, he is employed as a Professor and Head of the School of Psychology at the University of St. Andrews. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.

Alex Haslam is Professor of Social and Organizational Psychology at the University of Exeter. He is former Associate Editor of the *British Journal of Social Psychology* (1999–2001) and Chief Editor of the *European Journal of Social Psychology* (2002–2005), and currently on the editorial board of eight international journals. His work with colleagues at Exeter and around the world focuses on the study of social identity in social and organizational contexts, illustrated by his most recent book *Psychology in Organizations: The Social Identity Approach* (2nd ed., Sage, 2004). In 2005, he received a Kurt Lewin award for outstanding contribution to research in social psychology from the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, and in 2006, he was made a Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Advanced Research.

Rakshi Rath is currently a doctoral student at the University of St. Andrews having previously completed a Masters at the University of Delhi. Her current research concerns anti-Islamism amongst Hindu nationalists. She has conducted a number of studies that investigate how leading nationalists motivate hatred against Muslims and justify anti-Muslim violence. She has also examined how these leaders use these arguments in bidding for political influence.

Endnote

* Correspondence addresses: School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9JU, UK. Email: sdr@st-andrews.ac.uk; University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon, EX4 4QG, UK. Email: A.Haslam@exeter.ac.uk

References

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. M. (1950). *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York, NY: Harper.
- Allport, G. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Arendt, H. (1951). *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. San Diego, CA: Harvest.
- Arendt, H. (1963/1994). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York, NY: Penguin.
- Arendt, H. (1994). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
- Arendt, H. (2007). *The Jewish Writings*. New York, NY: Schocken Books.
- Asch, S. E. (1952). *Social Psychology*. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Banuazizi, A., & Movahedi, S. (1975). Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison: A methodological analysis. *American Psychologist*, **30**, 152–160.
- Banyard, P. (2007). Tyranny and the tyrant. *The Psychologist*, **20**, 2–8.
- Barker, R. (2001). *Legitimizing Identities*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Baron, R. S. (1984). Group dynamics. In A. S. Kahn (Ed.), *Social Psychology* (pp. 260–289). Dubuque, IA: W.C. Brown.
- Bar-Zohar, M. (1998). *Beyond Hitler's Grasp: The heroic rescue of Bulgaria's Jews*. Avon, MA: Adams Media.
- Bauman, Z. (1991). *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Oxford, UK: Polity.
- Ben-Yakov, A. (1990). Bulgaria. In I. Gutman (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* (2 vols.). New York, NY: MacMillan.
- Billig, M. (1976). *Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations*. London, UK: Academic Press.
- Billig, M. (1987). *Arguing and Thinking*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Blalock, H. M. (1967). Status inconsistency, social mobility, status integration and structural effects. *American Sociological Review*, **32**, 790–801.
- Blass, T. (2004). *The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Branscombe, N., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doojse, B. (1999). The context and content of social identity threat. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doojse (Eds.), *Social Identity: Context, Commitment, Content*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Brewer, M. B. (2001). Ingroup identification and intergroup conflict: When does ingroup love become outgroup hate? In R. D. Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict and Conflict Reduction*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future challenges. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, **30**, 745–778.
- Browning, C. (1992). *Ordinary men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*. London, UK: Penguin Books.
- Carter, D. T. (1995). *The Politics of Rage*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- Cassidy, C., Hopkins, N., Levine, M., Pandey, J., Reicher, S., & Singh, P. (2007). Social identity and Collective behaviour: Some lessons from Indian research at the Magh Mela at Prayag. *Psychological Studies*, **52**, 286–292.
- Catherwood, C. (2002). *Why the Nations Rage: Killing in the Name of God*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Cesarani, D. (2004). *Eichmann: His Life and Crimes*. London, UK: Heinemann.
- Condor, S. (1996). Social identity and time. In P. Robinson (Ed.), *Social Groups and Identities*. Oxford, UK: Butterworth: Heinemann.
- Dovidio, J. F., Glick, P., & Rudman, L. A. (2005). *On the Nature of Prejudice*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

- Dower, J. W. (1986). *War Without Mercy*. New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Drury, J., & Reicher, S. D. (2000). Collective action and social change: The emergence of new social identities. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, **39**, 579–604.
- Drury, J., & Reicher, S. D. (2005). Explaining enduring empowerment: A comparative study of collective action and psychological outcomes. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, **35**, 35–58.
- Duckitt, J. (2000). Culture, personality and prejudice. In S. A. Renshon & J. Duckitt (Eds.), *Political Psychology: Cultural and Crosscultural Foundations*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Duckitt, J. (2003). Prejudice and intergroup hostility. In D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, & R. Jervis (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, R. J. (2004). *The Coming of the Third Reich*. London, UK: Penguin Books.
- Falasca-Zamponi, S. (2000). *The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Fryer, D. (1984). *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain*. London, UK: Pluto.
- Fuller, W. C. (2006). *The Foe Within*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Goldhagen, D. J. (1996). *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. London, UK: Little, Brown and Company.
- Haney, C., Banks, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1973). A study of prisoners and guards in a simulated prison. In E. Aronson (Ed.), *Readings About the Social Animal* (3rd edn, pp. 52–67). San Francisco, CA: Freeman.
- Haslam, S. A. (2001). *Psychology in Organizations*. London, UK: Sage.
- Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. D. (in prep). *The Social Psychology of Resistance: Using Prison Studies to Extend Theoretical Imagination*. Unpublished manuscript: Universities of Exeter and St Andrews.
- Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. D. (2007). Beyond the banality of evil: Three dynamics of an interactionist social psychology of tyranny. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, **33**, 615–622.
- Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. D. (2008). Questioning the banality of evil. *The Psychologist*, **21**, 16–19.
- Haslam, S. A., O'Brien, A., Jetten, J., Vormedal, K., & Penna, S. (2005). Taking the strain: Social identity, social support and the experience of stress. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, **44**, 355–370.
- Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. D. (2006a). Debating the psychology of tyranny: Fundamental issues of theory, perspective and science. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, **45**, 55–63.
- Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. D. (2006b). Stressing the group: Social identity and the unfolding dynamics of stress. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, **91**, 1037–1052.
- Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., McGarty, C., & Reynolds, K. J. (1998). The group as a basis for emergent stereotype consensus. *European Review of Social Psychology*, **8**, 203–239.
- Hitler, A. (1980). *Mein Kampf*. London, UK: Hutchinson.
- Hofstadter, R. (1996). *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jetten, J., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. R. (1997). Strength of identification and intergroup differentiation: The influence of group norms. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, **27**, 603–609.
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2001). *Terror in the Mind of God*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Kaur, R. (2003). *Performative Politics and the Cultures of Hinduism*. Delhi, India: Permanent Black.
- Kershaw, I. (1987). *The 'Hitler Myth'*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Kiernan, V. G. (1995). *The Lords of Human Kind*. London, UK: Serif.
- King, R. D., & Wheelock, D. (2007). Group threat and social control: Race, perceptions of minorities and the desire to punish. *Social Forces*, **85**, 1255–1280.
- Konečni, V. J. (2007). Bad apples and bad barrels: Bad metaphors and blind spots regarding evil? *APS Observer*, **20** (5), 9–10.
- Koonz, C. (2003). *The Nazi Conscience*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
- Langbein, H. (1994). *Against All Hope: Resistance in Nazi Concentration Camps 1938–45*. London, UK: Constable.

- Levine, M., Cassidy, C., Brazier, G., & Reicher, S. D. (2002). Self-categorisation and bystander non-intervention: Two experimental studies. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *7*, 1452–1463.
- Levine, M., Prosser, A., Evans, D., & Reicher, S. D. (2005). Identity and emergency intervention: How social group membership and inclusiveness of group boundaries shapes helping behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*, 443–453.
- Livingstone, A., & Haslam, S. A. (2008). The importance of social identity content in a situation of chronic social conflict: Understanding intergroup relations in Northern Ireland. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *47*, 1–21.
- Lovibond, S. H., Mithiran, & Adams, W. G. (1979). The effects of three experimental prison environments on the behaviour of non-convict volunteer subjects. *Australian Psychologist*, *14*, 273–285.
- Lozowick, Y. (2002). *Hitler's Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil* (trans. H. Watzman). London, UK: Continuum.
- Ludden, D. (1996). *Contesting the Nation*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Mantell, D. M., & Panzarella, R. (1976). Obedience and responsibility. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, *15*, 239–245.
- Miles, R., & Phizacklea, A. (1984). *White Man's Country*. London, UK: Pluto.
- Miles, R. (1989). *Racism*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *67*, 371–378.
- Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Miller, A. (2004). What can the Milgram obedience experiments tell us about the Holocaust? Generalizing from the social psychology laboratory. In A. Miller (Ed.), *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil* (pp. 193–239). New York, NY: Guilford.
- Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (1998). Positive–negative asymmetry in social discrimination. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *9*, 107–143.
- Némirovsky, I. (2006). *Suite Française*. London, UK: Chatto & Windus.
- Newman, L. S. (2001). *The Banality of Secondary Sources: Why Social Psychologists Have Misinterpreted Arendt's Thesis*. Unpublished manuscript: Syracuse University.
- Novick, P. (2000). *The Holocaust and Collective Memory*. London, UK: Bloomsbury.
- Overy, R. (2004). *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia*. London, UK: Allen Lane.
- Piliavin, J. A. (2006). *Volunteering Across the Life-Span: Doing Well by Doing Good*. Paper presented to EAESP Small Group Meeting on 'Group-level perspectives on giving and receiving help'. Germany: Muhbrook.
- Piterburg, G. (2007). Zion's rebel daughter. *New Left Review*, *48* (November/December).
- Poole, R. (1999). *Nation and Identity*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Rees, L. (1997). *The Nazis: A Warning from History*. London, UK: BBC Books.
- Rees, L. (2005). *Auschwitz: The Nazis and the 'Final Solution'*. London, UK: BBC Books.
- Reicher, S. D. (1984). The St. Pauls riot: An explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of a social identity model. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *14*, 1–21.
- Reicher, S. D. (1996). The Battle of Westminster: Developing the social identity model of crowd behaviour in order to deal with the initiation and development of collective conflict. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *26*, 115–134.
- Reicher, S. D. (2001). Crowds and social movements. In M. Hogg & S. Tindale (Eds.), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Reicher, S. D. (2004). The context of social psychology: Domination, resistance and change. *Political Psychology*, *25*, 40–62.
- Reicher, S. D. (2007). Rethinking the paradigm of prejudice. *South African Journal of Psychology*, *37*, 820–834.
- Reicher, S. D., & Haslam, S. A. (2006a). Rethinking the psychology of tyranny: The BBC Prison Study. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *45*, 1–40.
- Reicher, S. D., & Haslam, S. A. (2006b). Tyranny revisited: Groups, psychological well-being and the health of societies. *The Psychologist*, *19*, 146–150.
- Reicher, S. D., & Haslam, S. A. (2006c). On the agency of individuals and groups: Lessons from the BBC Prison Study. In T. Postmes & J. Jetten (Eds.), *Individuality and the Group: Advances in Social Identity* (pp. 237–257). London, UK: Sage.

- Reicher, S. D., & Hopkins, N. (2001). *Self and Nation*. London, UK: Sage.
- Reicher, S. D., Cassidy, C., Wolpert, I., Hopkins, N., & Levine, M. (2006). Saving Bulgaria's Jews: An analysis of social identity and the mobilisation of social solidarity. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, **36**, 49–72.
- Reicher, S. D., Haslam, S. A., & Hopkins, N. (2005). Leaders and followers as collaborative agents in the transformation of social reality. *Leadership Quarterly*, **16**, 547–568.
- Reicher, S. D., Hopkins, N., Levine, M., & Rath, R. (2006). Entrepreneurs of hate and entrepreneurs of solidarity: Social identity as a basis for mass communication. *International Review of the Red Cross*, **87**, 621–637.
- Reynolds, K. J., Turner, J. C., & Haslam, S. A. (2000). When are we better than them and they worse than us? A closer look at social discrimination in positive and negative domains. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **78**, 64–80.
- Robespierre, M. (2007). *Virtue and Terror*. London, UK: Verso.
- Rousset, D. (1947/2005). *L'Univers Concentrationnaire*. Paris, France: Editions de Minuit.
- Schwarz, B. (1982). The people in history: The Communist Part Historians Group, 1946–56. In *Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Making History: Studies in History Writing and Politics*. London, UK: Hutchison.
- Scurr, R. (2006). *Fatal purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution*. London, UK: Chatto and Windus.
- Sherif, M. (1966). In *Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Sindic, D., & Reicher, S. D. (forthcoming). Attitudes towards superordinate groups: The moderating role of identity undermining. *European Journal of Social Psychology*.
- Stanley, A. (2006, June 1). 'The human behavior experiments': What can be done in the name of obedience. *The New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/01/arts/television/01huma.html> (Retrieved June 7, 2006).
- Staub, E. (1989). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Stern, J. P. (1975). *Hitler: The Fuhrer and the People*. London, UK: Flamingo.
- Stott, C., & Reicher, S. D. (1998). How conflict escalates: The inter-group dynamics of collective football crowd 'violence'. *Sociology*, **32**, 353–377.
- Stott, C., Hutchison, P., & Drury, J. (2001). 'Hooligans' abroad? Inter-group dynamics, social identity and participation in collective 'disorder' at the 1998 World Cup Finals. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, **40**, 359–384.
- Tajfel, H. (1981). Social stereotypes and social groups. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds.), *Intergroup Behaviour* (pp. 144–167). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Thompson, E. P. (1971). The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century. *Past and Present*, **50**, 76–136.
- Todorov, T. (2001). *The Fragility of Goodness*. London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Todorov, T. (2004). *Hope and Memory*. London, UK: Atlantic Books.
- Torpey, J. (1999). *The Invention of the Passport*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Turner, J. C. (1982). Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (pp. 15–40). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Turner, J. C. (1991). *Social Influence*. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press.
- Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-categorization Theory*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. (2000). *Co-operation in Groups: Procedural Justice, Social Identity and Behavioral Engagement*. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
- Vetlesen, A. J. (2005). *Evil and Human Agency*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Waller, J. (2002). *Becoming Evil*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Zertal, I. (2005). *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Zimbardo, P. (1969). The human choice: Individuation, reason and order versus deindividuation, impulse and chaos. In W. J. Arnold & D. Levine (Eds.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* (vol. 17). Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.
- Zimbardo, P. (1989). *Quiet Rage: The Stanford Prison Study* [video]. Stanford, CA: Stanford University.
- Zimbardo, P. (2004). A situationist perspective on the psychology of evil: Understanding how good people are transformed into perpetrators. In A. Miller (Ed.), *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil: Understanding Our Capacity for Kindness and Cruelty* (pp. 21–50). New York, NY: Guilford.
- Zimbardo, P. (2007). *The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil*. London, UK: Random House.
- Zizek, S. (2007). Robespierre, or the 'divine violence' of terror. Introduction to M. Robespierre. *Virtue and Terror*. London, UK: Verso.